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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of
potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with
heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices
above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below
the cap. A cap only for larger firms does not guarantee market prices
below that cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for smaller firms
destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being
above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with
considerably higher bid floors.
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1 Introduction
This study aims at deriving in a very simple framework with perfect infor-
mation, how different sorts of bid regulations change the possible range of
equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous
bidders. Such auctions are very common in electricity markets1, but are also
used in, for example, treasury auctions (see e.g. Brenner et al. (2009)), emis-
sion permit auctions (see e.g. Betz et al. (2010)) and even in order to place
IPOs on financial markets (see e.g. Degeorge et al. (2010)). This paper ana-
lyzes the effects of general and selective bid caps and bid floors on an auction
where multiple units of a homogenous product are traded at a uniform price
for all successful bidders independent of their specific bid.
Bid caps, bid floors and reserve prices exist in a couple of multi unit
uniform price auctions. They are currently intensely discussed for markets in
which pollution permits are traded in order to reduce uncertainty with regard
to their price and the resulting opportunity costs of investments in abatement
(see e.g. Wood and Jotzo (2011) and Hasegawa and Salant (2015)). The
analysis here is, however, inspired by the New York Installed Capacity Market
(NYICAP) for electricity generating capacity. It considers bid caps and bid
floors in a procurement setting and in a certain environment.2 The paper
models general as well as selective bid floors and general as well as selective
bid caps. Selective as opposed to general refers to not all bidders having to
obey them. In the NYICAP inspired setting bidders differ in the capacity
they can sell. Selective bid caps apply only to firms with large capacities,
whereas selective bid floors only apply to firms with small capacities.3
Note that a bid cap in a procurement auction is equivalent to a reserve
price in an auction where the auctioneer does not buy, as in our setting, but
1The Electricity Pool in England and Wales before the reform in 2001, the Nord Pool
in Scandinavia, the Spanish wholesale market, as well as the NYISO and the ERCOT
market in the US are still or were organized as multi-unit uniform price auctions. See
Bergman et al. (1999), Crampes and Fabra (2005), Newbery (2005), Hortac¸su and Puller
(2008) and Zhang (2009).
2The downward sloping linear demand for capacity in the NYICAP is known to the
bidders.
3Note that the NYICAP market has general and selectively more stringent bid caps
for large capacity owners, but only selective and no general bid floors. The selective bid
floors apply to new entrants which are most likely but not necessarily small in capacities.
For the details of the NYICAP market’s regulation see the New York ISO’s homepage
www.nyiso.com
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sells something as in the typical theoretical auction design. In an optimal
standard single unit auction design with heterogenous bidders the auctioneer
should discriminate his or her reservation prices according to the bidders’
types and potentially distort the reservation prices above his or her true
valuation (see Myerson (1981) and for qualifications of his results Levin and
Smith (1996) and Jehiel and Lamy (2015)). In addition Bresky (2013) shows
under which conditions reserve prices do not only increase the auctioneer’s
expected revenues in a simple multi-unit uniform price auction with ex ante
symmetric bidders, but also overall welfare. The investigated discriminatory
application of bid caps are here, however, not part of an optimal auction
design.
The approach here resembles more the one of Kotowski (2015) who shows
for a single unit auction with ex ante homogenous bidders that assigning
a higher reservation price to one group of bidders than to the remaining
bidders might benefit that group due to the externality that the rest of the
bidders bid at a lower level due to their lower reservation price. The selective
bid cap, analyzed here, potentially also creates such an externality for the
large capacity bidders to whom the cap applies in the analyzed multi-unit
procurement setting. The reason is that, similar to the single unit auction,
it can change the bidding behaviour of those bidders to whom the selective
bid cap does not apply.
The analysis of selective bid caps relates to the literature on handicaps
in single unit procurement auctions which emphasizes that the targeted
favoured group might not necessarily benefit from another group’s handi-
cap (see e.g. Kirkegaard (2013) and Mares and Swinkels (2014)). The same
can be true in this study’s otherwise pretty different multi-unit procurement
setting where the handicapped group with a lower bid cap might, despite a
reduction in the procurement price, finally benefit from its handicap. The
handicap might induce another unconstrained firm to overbid the constrained
firms such that the former highest bidder procures now a larger quantity at
a lower price but still generates higher profits.
This theoretical study is based on a very simple model of a multi-unit
uniform price auction without asymmetric information, first introduced by
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993).4. The particular version of the model
used here is a linear version of the more general one, presented in Moreno
4Schwenen (2015) shows that the NYICAP data from 2006-2008 are in line with the
conclusions of such an auction model
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and Ubeda (2006) and Ubeda (2004). To my knowledge bid regulations have
never been theoretically analyzed in this framework.5
There is, however, an experimental literature which investigates the effect
of automated mitigation procedures and/or soft price caps on the prices in
stylized electricity markets (see, e.g. Kiesling and Wilson (2007) who also
consider their effect on investment decisions, Vossler et al. (2009) and Shawan
et al. (2011)) and the effect of general price caps on the bidding behavior of
firms and their investment decisions (see Le Coq et al. (2016)). The stylized
electricity markets in these experimental papers resemble the model of multi-
unit auctions in von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) with ex ante symmetric
bidders and an inelastic stochastic demand. Vossler et al. (2009) has also
an additional treatment with a price elastic demand. The considered bid or
price regulations are, however, different in these papers.
Kiesling and Wilson (2007) and Vossler et al. (2009) consider soft price
caps where the auctioneer treats all price bids below each unit’s relevant soft
price cap as in a uniform price auction, but those above as in a discriminatory
price auction. These mechanisms are obviously very different from either
selective or general bid caps analyzed here exclusively in the framework of
uniform price auctions. Shawan et al. (2011) assume a soft price cap, which
relates to the average historical successful bids for the specific generation unit
in case of congestion in the experimental network. In their case the auctioneer
calculates the fictitious uniform price in case no firm had exceeded its soft bid
cap. If the uniform price derived from the actual bids exceeds this fictitious
price by a certain threshold, then each bid above the relevant soft price cap is
substituted by its soft price cap. This is a bit closer to the analyzed situation
here with selective bid caps. However, the bid caps here are not dynamic
and do not allow the bidders to manipulate future caps via their own current
bidding behavior like in Shawan et al. (2011).
The experiments in Le Coq et al. (2016) show in line with the predictions
from theory that prices are significantly higher with a pivotal bidder than
without. The market price is, however, more often identical with the lower
price cap than with the higher price cap which is not in line with theory.
The latter might, however, be due to the also larger capacity investment
incentive with higher price caps. In the analyzed model here, due to the
5de Frutos and Fabra (2012) investigate, however, the effect of regulated forward po-
sitions on the bidding behaviour of competing firms and the equilibrium price in a very
similar framework than the one here.
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price elastic demand, equilibrium prices can differ from either the price cap
or the marginal costs. Whether equilibrium prices can, however, deviate
from the marginal cost level, also depends on whether there exists at least
one firm with a pivotal status.6 Contrary to the experimental setting in Le
Coq et al. (2016) the analysis does only consider exogenous capacities and
does not allow for investments.
The main results here are that without any bid regulations the possible
equilibrium prices do not only depend on the total capacity in the market rel-
ative to the demand parameter, but also on the distribution of that capacity
among the bidders. Under usual circumstances general bid caps do not only
prevent bids and therefore equilibrium prices above the bid cap, but they
also allow equilibrium prices far below the bid cap to exist which otherwise
would not be sustainable. Thus, the auctioneer can potentially reduce mar-
ket power in the market and procure higher quantities via the introduction of
general bid caps. Only if total capacities are either very small or very large
there is no effect. If bid caps only apply to firms with relatively large ca-
pacities their effect might be weakened if some intermediately sized firms are
not restricted and can still set their monopoly price on the residual demand
above the bid cap. Sufficiently high general price floors applied to all firms
destroy pure strategy equilibria at the lower end of the equilibrium price
range, even if their equilibrium price exceeds the price floor. This implies
potentially more market power of the bidders, more expensive procurement
and smaller procured quantities. With general bid floors the only remaining
pure strategy equilibrium might be the one where all firms bid at the floor.
If this happens, the auctioneer avoids at least also the market equilibria with
the highest market power and the lowest procured quantity. With selective
bid floors this is not an option. If, in this case, the floors are sufficiently high
(but below the highest equilibrium price without price floors) pure strategy
equilibria seize to exist.
Section 2 introduces the main assumptions and identifies the characteris-
tics of the market outcome without any bid regulation. Section 3 focusses on
the market outcome changes if the system operator either introduces general
bid caps or bid caps only for firms with relatively large capacities, or if the
system operator introduces general price floors or price floors only for firms
with relatively small capacities. In section five I discuss whether the firms
with a stricter bid cap or a higher bid floor than the other firms necessarily
6Here we call such a firm potentially price setting or marginal.
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suffer or can potentially also gain from such a discrimination compared to
the other firms in the market. The final conclusions in section 5 focus on
which changes one can expect to observe on the NYICAP market due to the
changes of the bid regulation in 2008 and what might have motivated these
changes. In addition the section also discusses whether the findings of this
study are also relevant for other markets which are organized as multi-unit
uniform price auctions.
2 The Model without Bid Regulations
2.1 Model Assumptions
Consider a market with a set of N = {1, 2, . . . , n} active firms with n > 2.
Each firm i ∈ N owns a certain amount of capacity Ki that it potentially
can supply on the capacity market. For now it is assumed that supplying
parts of the capacity or all of it on the market does not cause any costs.
Assume that the firms are indexed such that Ki ≥ Ki+1. In addition define
K¯ =
∑n
i=1Ki as the total capacity available, and K¯−i = K¯ −Ki as the total
capacity available if firm i does not supply its capacity Ki. Demand D(p)
for capacity is linear in the market price p with
D(p) = α− βp and α, β > 0. (1)
Each firm can submit a price bid bi ≥ 0 at or above which it is willing to
supply its total capacity Ki to the market.
7 The auctioneer sorts all bids
according to the demanded price in an ascending order and forms an aggre-
gate supply function. The equilibrium price is the price at which the supply
function equals the ex ante publicly known demand.8 All firms which bid
their capacity at a price below the equilibrium price sell their total capac-
ity. Those, which bid above, sell nothing, whereas the marginal firm(s) that
bids(bid) the equilibrium price might be rationed in order to balance sup-
ply and demand.9 The vector of all bids (b1, . . . , bn) needs to be a Nash
7The Model is the same as in Moreno and Ubeda (2006) and Ubeda (2004) only with
a more specified linear demand and, for now, without any possibility to invest in capacity.
8Note that the market clearing price p does not need to be identical with any of the bids
if market clearing happens between two existing bids or if the highest bid is insufficient to
balance supply and demand.
9In the case of multiple marginal bidders we assume that they are rationed according to
their relative share in the total capacity bid at the marginal price by the marginal bidders.
6
equilibrium in order to determine an equilibrium price in the auction.
Note that if the firms could split their total capacity into l ≥ 1 discrete
pieces for which they could demand different minimum prices to supply them
to the market, this would not change the potential equilibrium prices.10
2.2 The Equilibria of the Unregulated Model
When characterizing the potential market equilibria which depend on the
capacities held by the firms, it is worthwhile as in Moreno and Ubeda (2006)
to split the firms according to their capacities in those who can potentially
be price setting or marginal in an equilibrium and those who cannot. For
the start define the two sets of firms
Q = {j ∈ N |K¯−j < α} and O = {j ∈ N |K¯−j ≥ α}. (2)
Proposition 1 The firms j ∈ O can only set the marginal price in a Nash
equilibrium if Q = ∅. Then the equilibrium price is p = bj = 0. If Q 6= ∅,
then the price in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium needs to be strictly larger
than the marginal costs of zero.
Proof. Suppose j ∈ O and bj > 0 is the equilibrium price. This is only
possible if the bids of all other firms i ∈ N , i 6= j, satisfy bi ≥ bj. However,
then any firm i 6= j has an incentive to undercut firm j slightly in a Bertrand
fashion in order to increase its profit. If, on the other hand, j ∈ O and
bj = 0, then p = bj = 0 cannot be an equilibrium price, if there are still
firms i ∈ Q. These firms always have an incentive by unilaterally bidding
α > bi > bj = 0 to increase the price to bi and, thus, increase their profit.
This argument holds also true, if the low bidding firm with bj = 0 belongs
to the set Q instead. 
Not surprisingly, firms, whose capacity is so small that it is never needed
to supply total demand, even at a price of zero (j ∈ O), can never be price
setters in equilibrium as long as other firms have capacities large enough to
be necessary to satisfy demand at a price of zero.
10See also Fabra et al. (2006) who prove this in their Lemma 2 for 2 competing firms,
Schwenen (2015) who makes an argument for n > 2 firms and the explanation in Appendix
A.
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Let us assume for the rest of the analysis that the firms’ capacities are
such that Q 6= ∅. This implies
K¯ ≥ Kj > K¯ − α for some j ∈ N. (3)
The residual demand of firm j ∈ Q
Dr(p, K¯−j) = max{α− K¯−j − βp, 0}
is the demand left to firm j if all other firms in the market offer their total
capacities and demand is efficiently rationed. For firm j’s residual demand
firm j’s monopoly price is
pj = arg max{pDr(p, K¯−j)} = α− K¯−j
2β
. (4)
The price pj is only feasible as an equilibrium price if D
r(pj, K¯−j) < Kj or
Kj > α− K¯. (5)
If for none of the firms j ∈ Q condition (5) holds, the only feasible equilibrium
price is the minimum market clearing price
p¯ =
{
p|D(p) = K¯} = α− K¯
β
. (6)
The following proposition characterizes the potential Nash equilibria in the
multi-unit uniform price auction.
Proposition 2 If Q 6= ∅ then, depending on the capacities of the firms j ∈
Q, we can distinguish between two different cases.
(i) If Kj ≤ α−K¯ for all j ∈ Q, there are infinitely many equilibria in pure
strategies where each firm j ∈ N bids bj ≤ p¯. The equilibrium price is
p = p¯ regardless of the firms bids and all firms j ∈ N sell their total
capacity Kj.
(ii) If Kj > α − K¯ for some j ∈ Q, there are multiple equilibria in pure
strategies where one of the firms j ∈ P with
P = {j ∈ Q|Kj ≥ (α− K¯)
2 +K21
2K1
} (7)
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bids bj = pj as defined in (4) and sells the part of its capacity necessary
to satisfy the residual demand Dr(pj, K¯−j). All other firms i ∈ N \ j
bid bi ≤ bj with
bj =
(α− K¯ +Kj)2
4βKj
< pj = bj (8)
and sell their total capacity Ki. The equilibrium price is identical with
the bid bj = pj = p of the highest bidding firm j.
Proof. See the argument in Appendix B.1. 
Proposition 2 implies that, if all firms j ∈ Q have a rather small capacity
with Kj ≤ α − K¯, then the equilibrium price is always determined by the
balance of total available capacity and the demand for capacity and is given
by p¯ as defined in (6).11 If some firms j ∈ Q are larger with Kj > α− K¯, the
firm with the largest capacity, firm 1, then necessarily belongs to P as defined
in (7), meaning it could potentially be a price setting firm with b1 = p1 = p.
However, whether firm 1 is the only possible price setting firm, and therefore
p1 the only equilibrium outcome, depends on the capacities of the other firms
j ∈ Q. Given K1 > α− K¯, and therefore also 1 ∈ P , two different situations
characterized in figure 1 and 2 can occur.
Suppose K¯ < α as in figure 1, then all firms j ∈ N belong to Q and O = ∅.
Note that if 0 < K¯ < α
2
, meaning total capacity is smaller than the capacity
that a not capacity constrained monopolist would offer, we necessarily have
α − K¯ > α
2
> K1. Neither firm 1 nor any other firm j with Kj < K1 can
be an element in P and be price setting in equilibrium. This situation is
sketched on the left-hand side of figure 1. With K¯ < α and K1 ≥ Kj for
all j 6= 1 only those combinations of K1 and Kj can occur which lie to the
east of the upward sloping and to the west of the downward sloping dashed
45o-degree line. Thus, P = ∅ and the equilibrium price is necessarily the
minimum market clearing price p = p¯.
Suppose α
2
< K¯ < α, meaning total capacity exceeds the monopoly
supply of an unconstrained monopolist but falls short of the supply in an
unconstrained competitive market. Then firm 1 can be a price setter in
equilibrium, if K1 > α− K¯, implying 1 ∈ P . Whether other firms j ∈ Q can
also be price setters (and elements of P ) depends on their capacity relative
11In Figure 1 this is the case as soon as K1 ≤ α − K¯ which necessarily implies Kj ≤
K1 ≤ α for all j ∈ Q.
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Figure 1: Characterization of Potentially Price Setting Firms with K¯ < α
to the capacity of firm 1. If their smaller capacity is relatively close to
firm 1’s, such that j ∈ P , they can also be price setting firms and their
monopoly prices on their respective residual demand p = pj can also be
market equilibria. On the right-hand side in figure 1 all potentially price
setting firms j with Kj ≤ K1 must have a capacity Kj above the bold curve,
but since K¯ < α also implies K1 +Kj ≤ K¯ < α these firms capacities cannot
be to the east of the dashed downward sloping 45o-line.
Now suppose α ≤ K¯ < 2α (total capacity exceeds the supply in an un-
constrained perfectly competitive market) as in figure 2, then not all firms
are necessarily an element of Q. If Q = ∅ this implies a relatively even distri-
bution of all capacities and that proposition 1 applies with the equilibrium
price being p = 0 as in an unconstrained perfectly competitive market. How-
ever, if Q 6= ∅, then firm 1 ∈ Q and firm 1 ∈ P necessarily holds. Thus, firm
1 can be a price setter with p = p1. In addition all those firms j ∈ Q with a
capacity Kj ≤ K1 such that it exceeds the bold curved line on the left-hand
side of figure 2 can also be price setters which would result in an equilibrium
price of p = pj.
Note that as soon as K1 > α holds, no other firm j 6= 1 can be an element
of Q and therefore P because necessarily K−j > α. The equilibrium price
can only be either firm 1’s monopoly price on its residual demand p = p1, if
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j
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Figure 2: Characterization of Potentially Price Setting Firms with α ≤ K¯
K1 > K¯ − α, or the perfectly competitive price in a non-constrained market
p = 0, if K1 ≤ K¯ − α and proposition 1 applies. These are the only two
possible prices for K¯ > 2α, the case illustrated on the right-hand side of
figure 2.
Obviously, the potential market prices and highest potential bids in the
market depend, on the one hand, on the level of the total capacity but, on the
other hand, also on how unequally distributed the capacities of the different
generators are.12 The following corollary characterizes the upper and lower
limit of the market price and results mainly from proposition 1, the definition
of P in equation (7) of proposition 2 and the definition of the market price,
given in equation (4).
Corollary 1 The market prices depend on the total capacity and on the
inequality of the individual firms’ capacities in the following way.
(i) For 0 ≤ K¯ < α
2
the market price is unique and satisfies
p =
α− K¯
β
= p¯.
12This resembles the result of de Frutos and Fabra (2012) who show in a similar setting
that the equilibrium prices do not only depend on the total regulated forward positions of
all the firms in the market but also how they are distributed among all the firms.
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(ii) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α the market price is either unique and satisfies
p =
α− K¯
β
= p¯ if K1 < α− K¯ holds,
or otherwise p ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
,
α− K¯ +K1
2β
]
.
(iii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α the market price is either unique and satisfies
p = 0 if K1 < K¯ − α holds,
or p ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
,
α− K¯ +K1
2β
]
if K¯ − α ≤ K1 < α holds,
or otherwise it is again unique with p =
α− K¯ +K1
2β
= p1.
(iv) For 2α ≤ K¯ the market price is always unique and
p = 0 if K1 < K¯ − α holds and
p =
α− K¯ +K1
2β
= p1 otherwise.
Corollary 2 characterizes the non-marginal bids and follows from applying
proposition 1 and the definition of P , given in equation (7), to the upper
limit of the non-marginal bids, given in equation (8) of proposition 2.
Corollary 2 The non-marginal bids in equilibrium need to satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions.
(i) For 0 ≤ K¯ < α
2
all bids can be non-marginal and need to satisfy
bj ≤ α− K¯
β
for all j ∈ N.
(ii) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α again all bids need to satisfy
bj ≤ α− K¯
β
if K1 < α− K¯ holds.
If α− K¯ ≤ K1 holds instead, the non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ b with b ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)4
8βK1[(α− K¯)2 +K21 ]
,
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
]
.
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(iii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α all bids are marginal and must satisfy
bj = 0 for all j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
If K¯−α ≤ K1 < α holds instead, the non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ bj with bj ∈
[
(α− K¯ +K1)4
8βK1[(α− K¯)2 +K21 ]
,
(α− K¯ +K1)2
4βK1
]
or, if α ≤ K1 holds, they need to satisfy
bi ≤ (α− K¯ +K1)
2
4βK1
= b1.
(iv) For 2α ≤ K¯ again all bids are marginal and must satisfy
bj = 0 for j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
If K1 ≥ K¯ − α holds instead, the non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ (α− K¯ +K1)
2
4βK1
= b1.
3 The Effect of Bid Regulations on Market
Outcomes
This section analyzes how different types of bid regulations change the market
outcomes. First it focusses on maximum bids in the form of bid caps and
later on bid floors or minimum bids. In both cases the analysis starts with
either general bid caps or general bid floors which apply to all firms in the
market. Afterwards the focus shifts to selective bid regulations, meaning bid
caps only for firms with large capacities and bid floors only for firms with
low capacities.13
13The NYICAP market which inspired this study has general and selectively more strin-
gent bid caps, but only selective and no general bid floors.
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3.1 The Effect of Bid Caps
3.1.1 General Bid Caps
A general bid cap can only have an effect if it forces at least some firms to
change their bidding behaviour. From proposition 1 we know that if Q = ∅
then all firms j ∈ O = N bid bj = 0 and the equilibrium price is p = 0. No
bid cap that forces all firms j ∈ N to bid bj ≤ bˆ with bˆ ≥ 0 can change this
bidding behaviour. This is obviously different if Q 6= ∅ and proposition 2
applies without a bid cap.
Suppose Kj ≤ α− K¯ for all firms j ∈ Q. Then the bid cap might change
the bidding behaviour if bˆ < p¯ holds. Note, however, that the price p¯, defined
in equation (6), balances total capacity with total demand. Thus, the bid cap
would here, nevertheless, not change the market price, because total supply
and total demand cannot be balanced at any price p ≤ bˆ < p¯. The auctioneer
needs to elevate the market price from the potentially highest bid bˆ to p = p¯
to balance total supply and demand. The same is true if some firms j ∈ Q
have a capacity with Kj > α− K¯, but the bid cap is still set such that bˆ < p¯,
then all firms bid at or below the bid cap bˆ, but the final market price is
again p = p¯.
Proposition 3 If Q = ∅ and all firms j ∈ N also satisfy j ∈ O, then a bid
cap bˆ ≥ 0 which only allows the firms to bid a price bj ≤ bˆ for their total
capacity, does not change the firms’ bidding behaviour. All firms j ∈ N still
bid bj = 0 and, thus, the market price is still p = bj = 0. If Q 6= ∅ and if
the bid cap is below the market clearing price (bˆ ≤ p¯), the bid cap, despite
potentially reducing the bid of some bidders j ∈ Q, does again not change the
market price of p = p¯ as defined in (6).
Proof. See the arguments above.
Suppose now Kj > α − K¯ for some j ∈ Q, then a higher bid cap with
bˆ > p¯ does not only potentially change the bidding behaviour, but also the
market outcome. For having an effect on the bidding behaviour, and on
the market price, the bid cap needs to either constrain the optimal bid of
the marginal bidder, or the bid cap needs to change the set of potentially
marginal bidders P as given in equation (7) in proposition 2.
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Proposition 4 If Q 6= ∅, if some firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj > α − K¯
and if the bid cap exceeds the market clearing price (bˆ > p¯), then the bid cap
only has an impact on the bidding behavior of the firms, if it constrains the
potential bids of some firms j ∈ Q, meaning pj > bˆ ⇔ Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯)
holds.
(i) If Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) holds for all firms j ∈ Q, then there is a set of
Nash equilibria where any of the firms j ∈ Q with Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯)
bids bj = bˆ and all other firms i ∈ N \ j set bi ≤ bˆj with
bˆj =
bˆ(α +Kj − K¯ − βbˆ)
Kj
< bj, (9)
and with bj defined in equation (8). The market price is p = bˆ.
(ii) If only for some firms j ∈ Q the condition Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) holds,
the equilibria described in (i) still exist, but there might be other Nash
equilibria. In these additional equilibria one of the other firms j ∈ Q
with α − K¯ ≤ Kj ≤ 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) bids its monopoly price on the
residual demand bj = pj = p < bˆ and all the other firms i ∈ N \ j bid
bi ≤ bj. These equilibria exist if j ∈ Pˆ with
Pˆ =
{
j ∈ Q|Kj ≥ 2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯)−K1(α− K¯)
K1
}
. (10)
If for all firms j ∈ Q the condition Kj ≤ 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) holds, the bid cap
has no effect on any firm’s bidding behaviour in equilibrium and proposition
2 still applies.
Proof. See the the proof in Appendix C.
Note that the threshold that the capacity of an unconstrained firm j (with
Kj > 2βbˆ−(α−K¯)) needs to exceed in order to be potentially price setting in
case (ii) (j ∈ Pˆ ) is lower than the threshold that defined whether firm j could
be a price setter without the bid cap (j ∈ P defined in proposition 2). This
results from other firms i ∈ Q with Ki > Kj and pi > bˆ finding it now less
attractive to overbid firm j because they are constrained to the bid cap bˆ and
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can no longer bid the monopoly price on their residual demand. Therefore
firms j ∈ Q with smaller capacities than before can be price setters in an
equilibrium and, if they are, smaller equilibrium prices prevail than without
the bid cap.
With K1 > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) and p1 > bˆ > p¯ firm 1 with the largest capacity
is constrained by the bid cap, but this also implies that K1 > α − K¯. The
latter excludes the case that 0 < K¯ < α
2
(or case (i) as well as part of case (ii)
from corollary 1). Corollary 3 characterizes the market prices in this case.
Corollary 3 If Q 6= ∅ and K1 ≤ 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) holds, then a bid cap bˆ > p¯
does not change the prices in the market, characterized in corollary 1. If,
however, Q 6= ∅ and K1 > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) hold, then a bid cap bˆ > p¯ changes
the market prices in the following way.
(i) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α the market prices satisfy now
p ∈
[
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
, bˆ
]
.
(ii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α the market price is unique and satisfies
p = 0 if K1 < K¯ − α holds.
If K¯ − α ≤ K1 < α holds instead, p ∈
[
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
, bˆ
]
and,
if α ≤ K1, the unique market price is p = bˆ.
(iii) For 2α ≤ K¯ the market price is always unique and satisfies
p = 0 if K1 < K¯ − α holds and
p = bˆ otherwise.
So, the bid cap does not only reduce the upper limit of the possible equi-
librium prices, but also reduces the lower limit, even if the lower limit does
not exceed the bid cap. This is due to the fact that now smaller firms j can
be price setting (with j /∈ P , but j ∈ Pˆ ), and smaller firms set lower prices
because they have a lower residual demand.
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Since the threshold for non-marginal bids bˆj, defined in equation (9),
increases in the capacity Kj of the price setting firm j, and now smaller
firms can be price setting, the bid cap also affects the non-marginal bids,
again without them necessarily exceeding the bid cap.
Corollary 4 Given Q 6= ∅ and K1 > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) hold, then a bid cap
bˆ > p¯ should influence the non-marginal bids in the following way.
(i) For α
2
≤ K¯ < α the non-marginal bids need to satisfy
bi ≤ bˆj with bˆj ∈
[
β2bˆ[2(α− K¯ − βbˆ) +K1]
2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯)−K1(α− K¯)
,
bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
]
.
(ii) For α ≤ K¯ < 2α the bids must satisfy
bj = 0 for all j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
If, in this case, K¯ − α ≤ K1 < α holds instead, the non-marginal bids
need to satisfy
bi ≤ bˆj with bˆj ∈
[
β2bˆ[2(α− K¯ − βbˆ) +K1]
2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯)−K1(α− K¯)
,
bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
]
,
or, if α ≤ K1,
bi ≤ bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
= bˆ1.
(iii) For 2α ≤ K¯ the bids must satisfy
bj = 0 for all j ∈ N if K1 < K¯ − α.
If, in this case, K¯ − α ≤ K1 holds instead, the non-marginal bids need
to satisfy
bi ≤ bˆ(α +K1 − K¯ − βbˆ)
K1
= bˆ1.
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3.1.2 Selective Bid Caps
What happens if the bid cap is only selectively applied to firms with Kj >
Kˆ > 0 instead of to all firms participating in the auction?14 Note that, if
either the bid cap bˆ applies to all potentially price setting firms j ∈ Q because
Kˆ < K¯ − α, or if it applies to all firms j ∈ Q for which the related bid cap
is potentially binding, meaning Kˆ ≤ 2βbˆ− (α− K¯),15 then nothing changes
compared to a general bid cap characterized in proposition 3 and 4 as well
as in corollary 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 Suppose Q 6= ∅ and that a bid cap, exceeding the market
clearing price (bˆ > p¯), is imposed only on firms j ∈ N with a capacity
Kj > Kˆ.
(i) This does not change the market equilibrium compared to a general bid
cap characterized in proposition 4, if either Kˆ < 2βbˆ+ K¯ − α or if all
the firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj > Kˆ.
(ii) If K1 < 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) holds, then the selective bid cap does not have
any influence on the equilibrium behaviour of any of the firms and the
market equilibria are still the same as in proposition 2 without any bid
cap.
Proof. For (i) see the argument above. No matter whether bid caps are
selective or applied to all firms, they need to constrain the optimal behaviour
of at least one firm to have an effect. Condition (ii) is the same as (iii)
in proposition 4 and ensures that even the largest firm with the highest
monopoly price on its residual demand is not constrained by the bid cap. 
Changes compared to a general bid cap can only occur if Kˆ > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯)
holds, meaning that the cap does not apply to all potentially constrained
firms with Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯). Firms with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯)
can, on the one hand, still bid their monopoly price on the residual demand,
14Note that in the NYICAP market Kˆ is determined such that Kˆ = K¯ −Kp > K¯ − α
with Kp ∈ (0, α) being the reference quantity. The firms with Kj > Kˆ = K¯ −Kp cannot
bid their capacity at a higher price than the reference price that satisfies Kp = α− βbˆ⇔
bˆ = α−K˜β .
15All firms j with Kj ≥ 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) have a monopoly price on their residual demand
which exceeds the bid cap, pj ≥ bˆ, and are potentially constrained by the bid cap.
18
although pj > bˆ holds, and, on the other hand, their optimal overbidding
strategy, in case a firm with a smaller capacity places the highest bid, is still
bj = pj > bˆ. The following proposition takes only these truly selective bid
caps into account.
Proposition 6 Suppose Q 6= ∅, that a bid cap, exceeding the market clearing
price (bˆ > p¯), is imposed only on firms j ∈ N with a capacity Kj > Kˆ, that
there are firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) and that at least the
largest firm 1 is constrained by the selective bid cap, meaning K1 > Kˆ >
2βbˆ− (α− K¯).
(i) The equilibria described in case (i) of proposition 4 with a constrained
firm j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ bidding bˆ and all the other firms i ∈ N \ j
bidding bi ≤ bˆj, defined in (9), only exist, if at the same point in time
there is no unconstrained firm i with capacity Ki ∈ (2βbˆ + K¯ − α +
2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α), Kˆ).
(ii) Additional equilibria exist, if there are unconstrained firms j ∈ Q, the
capacity of which satisfies 2βbˆ+ K¯ − α < Kj < Kˆ and
Kj ≥ K
2
i + (α− K¯)2
2Ki
for all i with Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ) (11)
being the capacity of any other larger selectively non-constrained firm
i. In these equilibria with p = pj one of these firms j bids its monopoly
price on its residual demand pj > bˆ and all other firms i ∈ N \ j bid
bi ≤ bj, defined in (8).
(iii) Equilibria with an unconstrained firm j ∈ Q with Kj ≤ 2βbˆ + K¯ − α
bidding its monopoly price on its residual demand pj ≤ bˆ and all other
firms i ∈ N \j bidding bi ≤ bj can still exist, if firm j’s capacity satisfies
condition (11) and Kj ∈ Pˆ as defined in (10) of proposition 4.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Proposition 6 has three major implications for the potential equilibrium.
First, equilibria where the firms j with the largest capacities, Kj > Kˆ, bid
the bid cap do no longer always exist. If there are selectively non-constrained
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firms i ∈ Q with capacity Ki ∈ (2βbˆ + K¯ − α + 2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α), Kˆ),
relatively close to the threshold Kˆ, these firms have an incentive to overbid
any firm j ∈ Q bidding bj = bˆ.
Second, prices above the bid cap can occur in equilibrium, if there are
firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯). They can be price setters in
equilibrium with p = pj > bˆ, if their capacity Kj is sufficiently large compared
to the largest selectively non-constrained firm (see condition (11)). Note
that condition (11) is not a pure subset of P defined in (7) of proposition
2 because it potentially also includes firms j 6∈ P with smaller capacities,
because the largest selectively non-constrained firm has a smaller capacity
than the largest firm 1 (Ki < Kˆ < K1).
Third, prices below the bid cap might only occur in equilibrium if, for
some firms j ∈ Q with Kj ≤ 2βbˆ+ K¯−α, both conditions, (11) and Kj ∈ Pˆ ,
defined in equation 10 of proposition 4, are satisfied. These two conditions
ensure that neither the larger constrained firms i ∈ Q with Ki > Kˆ, nor the
larger non constrained firms with Ki ≤ Kˆ want to overbid firm j. Which of
the two constraints is binding depends on the level of the bid cap bˆ and the
critical capacity level Kˆ above which firms are constrained.
Corollary 5 resembles corollary 1 and 3 and identifies the boundaries for
the equilibrium prices.
Corollary 5 Given Q 6= ∅ and some firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj >
2βbˆ − (α − K¯) then a bid cap bˆ > p¯, only applied to firms j ∈ Q with
Kj > Kˆ > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯), results in the same observed market prices as
in corollary 3, if there are no firms j with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯). If,
however, such firms exist and if at least K1 > Kˆ holds, the boundaries for
the market price change in the following way.
(i) For α
2
≤ K¯ < 2α the market price satisfies
p ∈
[
max
{
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
,
(α− K¯ + Kˆ)2
4βKˆ
}
,
α− K¯ + Kˆ
2β
]
.
(ii) For 2α ≤ K¯ the market price satisfies
p ∈
[
max
{
bˆ
α− βbˆ+K1 − K¯
K1
,
(α− K¯ + Kˆ)2
4βKˆ
}
,
α− K¯ + Kˆ
2β
]
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if K¯−α ≤ Kˆ < αholds, and is unique with p = α− K¯ + Kˆ
2β
if Kˆ > α.
If K1 ≤ Kˆ holds, then corollary 1 still applies.
As soon as bˆ < α−K¯+Kˆ
2β
< α−K¯+K1
2β
holds, a market price above the bid cap is
possible in the market. The price is strictly below the potential upper level
in the case without any bid cap described in corollary 1.
Under the restrictions of corollary 5 that a firm j exists with K1 > Kˆ >
Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) and bˆ > p¯, the case K1 < K¯ − α is implicitly excluded,
meaning the unconstrained perfectly competitive price p = 0 can never be
an equilibrium outcome. In addition p = α−K¯+Kˆ
2β
can only be a unique
equilibrium outcome if total capacity satisfies K¯ ≥ 2α. Otherwise the largest
firm’s capacity K1 and the just not constrained firm’s capacity Kˆ cannot both
exceed α.
3.2 The Effect of Bid Floors
Bid caps in a procurement setting potentially reduce the market power of the
bidding firms. Therefore it is easy to understand why an auctioneer might
be interested in implementing them.16 Since bid floors have intuitively the
opposite effect, it is not clear on first glance, why an auctioneer might find
them attractive.
In the NYICAP market the ISO’s motivation is to secure a sufficiently
high incentive to invest in new capacity. The ISO hopes that additional elec-
tricity generating capacity reduces the prices in another market, the market
for electricity. In the same way consideration outside of the auction at hand
must motivate bid caps in a traditional selling auction design which are
equivalent to bid floors in the procurement setting.17
16They are equivalent to a price floor in a traditional selling auction where they poten-
tially reduce bid shading.
17Caps in pollution permit auctions are currently not very high on the political agenda.
However those who oppose the introduction of bid floors usually argue that higher pollution
prices do not necessarily incentivize polluting industries to invest in abatement, but to
relocate to other jurisdictions where pollution is cheaper. Relocations mean local job and
growth losses. This argument could, of course, also motivate the introduction of price caps
in markets for pollution permits, if pollution prices are considered to be too high.
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3.2.1 A General Bid Floor
A general bid floor which is set at bf > 0 forces all firms j ∈ N to bid a
price for their capacity which exceeds the bid floor (bj ≥ bf ). Obviously,
this destroys the equilibrium that we have identified in proposition 1 for the
case of Q = ∅ in which all firms j ∈ N bid bj = 0 and the equilibrium price
would be p = 0. However, this is also the case where capacity is so abundant
that even the largest capacity is not needed to supply the potentially largest
demand. It is difficult to imagine that in such a situation the auctioneer
sees it fit to artificially increase the capacity’s price in order to, for example,
stimulate investment in it.
Now consider the case with scarcity but without market power where
Kj ≤ α − K¯ holds for all j ∈ Q and the market clearing price p¯ is the
equilibrium price (see proposition 2) without bid floors. Introducing one
with 0 < bf ≤ p¯ might destroy some of the equilibria where some firms j
bid bj < b
f without it, but the outcome in equilibrium is unchanged. The
equilibrium price is still the market clearing price p = p¯ set by the auctioneer
to balance demand with the totally available supply. Of course, if the bid
floor exceeds the market clearing price, bf > p¯, the market can never be
balanced and all equilibria described in proposition 2 (i) no longer exist.
Again, this does not seem especially relevant.18
Proposition 7 If Q 6= ∅ and Kj ≤ α − K¯ for all j ∈ Q, the level of the
general bid floor bf determines whether there are infinitely many equilibria
in pure strategies or none at all. If the bid floor is smaller than the market
clearing price (0 < bf ≤ p¯), all firms j ∈ N bid between these two prices (bf ≤
bj ≤ p¯) and the market equilibrium is p = p¯ as in case (i) of proposition 2
without a bid floor. If the bid floor exceeds the market clearing price (bf ≤ p¯)
the auctioneer can no longer clear the market and an equilibrium no longer
exists.
Proof. See the argument above. 
What changes if at least the largest capacity owner can have market power,
K1 > α−K¯? Again, then some of the equilibria described in proposition 2 (ii)
with the price setting firm j ∈ P bidding above the price floor bj = pj > bf
and with all non-price setting firms i ∈ N \ j setting bi < bf < bj < pj do
18The auctioneer could set such a price. No firm would sell its total capacity and none
of them had an incentive to invest. The price floor could not stimulate extra investments.
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no longer exist. However, this does not undermine pj as a market outcome,
as long as there are still equilibria with firm j ∈ P bidding bj = pj and all
other firms i ∈ N \ j bidding bf ≤ bi ≤ bj < pj.
These equilibria might, however, cease to exist, if the price floor exceeds
the threshold bj below which the firms i ∈ N\j need to bid in order to prevent
the price setting firm j from underbidding them in equilibrium without a
price floor. If all firms i 6= j bid the price floor bf ≥ bj instead, the price
setting firm j cannot underbid any of the other firms i ∈ N \ j. Thus, an
alternative equilibrium might exist in which firm j ∈ P with bj < bf bids its
monopoly price on its residual demand bj = pj and all other firms i ∈ N \ j
bid now bi = b
f . For this to be true, first, none of the firms i ∈ N \ j may
have an incentive to overbid firm j, and, second, firm j may not have an
incentive to match the other bidders by setting bj = b
f . Note that the set
P , defined in equation (7)) is constructed such, that the first condition holds
true if j ∈ P .19 The following proposition clarifies when the second condition
also holds true and the alternative equilibrium exists.
Proposition 8 If Q 6= ∅ and Kj > α − K¯ for some j ∈ Q, the type of
equilibrium which exist with a general bid floor bf > 0 again depends on its
level.
(i) If bf ≤ bj holds for all firms j ∈ P , there are still infinitely many
equilibria as in proposition 2 (ii). In these equilibria one firm j ∈
P bids its monopoly price on its residual demand and all other firms
i ∈ N \ j bid between the bid floor bf and the threshold bj, meaning
bf ≤ bi ≤ bj < pj. The equilibrium price is bj = pj = p.
(ii) If bj < b
f ≤ cj holds for some firms j ∈ P with
c¯j ≡ α
2β
−
√
(K¯ −Kj)Kj(K¯Kj − (α− K¯)2)
2βKj
< pj,
then there still can be multiple equilibria. In these equilibria one firm
j ∈ P bids its monopoly price on its residual demand which is the
equilibrium price bj = pj = p. The other firms i ∈ N \ j bid either
bi ∈ [bf , bj] or, if the bid floor exceeds the respective price setting firm’s
threshold bj, they bid the bid floor, bj < bi = b
f ≤ c¯j. Any firm j ∈ P ,
for which bf > c¯j holds, can no longer be price setting and its monopoly
price pj on its residual demand can no longer be the equilibrium price.
19See the proof of proposition 2 in B.1.
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(iii) If c¯j < b
f < pj for all firms j ∈ P , then there is a unique equilibrium
in which all firms i ∈ N bid bi = bf .
Proof. See the arguments above for the destruction of some of the pure
strategy equilibria from proposition 2 (ii). Note that
∂bj
∂Kj
=
K2j − (α− K¯)2
4βK2j
> 0,
meaning the threshold bj increases in the capacity of the price setting firm
j ∈ P . That implies that none of the equilibria described in proposition 2
(ii) continue to exist if the price floor exceeds the largest firm’s threshold,
bf > b1. For the conditions which ensure that the alternative pure strategy
equilibria exist, see Appendix E. 
Since the alternative threshold c¯j also increases in the price setting firm’s
capacity Kj, increasing the bid floor b
f destroys first the equilibria with
relatively low equilibrium prices. However, in the extreme case where the bid
floor exceeds even the largest firm’s threshold, bf > c¯1, all market equilibria
with market power disappear and, if the equilibrium was before p = p1, the
equilibrium price can be nevertheless be reduced if the price floor satisfies
c¯1 < b
f < p1.
3.2.2 A Selective Bid Floor
Now consider selective bid floors that force only some firms j ∈ N with
Kn < Kj < K˘ < K1 to bid bj ≥ bf > 0. Selective bid floors have the
same effect as general ones for all equilibria with a price setting firm j for
which bj > b
f . However, the difference is that with general bid floors a firm
j ∈ P with pj > c¯j > bf > bj can still bid bj = pj and be price setting
with everybody else bidding bi = b
f < pj in equilibrium, as described in
proposition 8. These equilibria do no longer exist, if the price setting firm
j’s capacity is such (Kj > K˘) that it is not constrained to bid at or above
bf . Therefore it has an incentive to underbid b
f above which the constrained
firms c ∈ N \ j with Kc < K˘ are forced to bid.
Thus selective bid floors destroy the alternative equilibria described in
proposition 8(ii) if the price setter j is not constrained by the floor. In
the extreme case where bf > b1, and all price setting firms j ∈ P are
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non-constrained with Kj ≥ K˘ the selective bid floor destroys all equilib-
ria, because all firms bidding bf is no longer an equilibrium. In this case any
potential price setter j ∈ P wants to underbid the constrained firms c with
bc = b
f > bj. The following proposition characterizes the equilibria with a
selective bid floor.
Proposition 9 If Q 6= ∅ and Kj > α− K¯ for some j ∈ Q, the selective bid
floor which forces only those firms j with Kj < K˘ < K1 to bid bj ≥ bf > 0
changes the type of equilibrium which exist relatively to proposition 8.
(i) If bf ≤ bj holds for all firms j ∈ P , there are still infinitely many
equilibria as in proposition 2 (ii). In these equilibria one firm j ∈ P
bids its monopoly price on its residual demand and all constrained firms
c ∈ N \ j with Kc < K˘ bid between the bid floor bf and the threshold
bj, meaning b
f ≤ bc ≤ bj < pj, whereas all other non-constrained firms
i ∈ N \ j with Ki ≥ K˘ bid 0 ≤ bi ≤ bj. The equilibrium price is
bj = pj = p.
(ii) If bj < b
f ≤ cj holds for some firms j ∈ P with
c¯j ≡ α
2β
−
√
(K¯ −Kj)Kj(K¯Kj − (α− K¯)2)
2βKj
< pj and Kj < K˘
for all these firms, then there still can be multiple equilibria. In these
equilibria one firm j ∈ P bids its monopoly price on its residual demand
which is the equilibrium price bj = pj = p. The other firms c ∈ N \ j
with Kc < K˘ bid either bc ∈ [bf , bj] or, if the bid floor exceeds the
respective price setting firm’s threshold bj, they bid the bid floor with
bj < bc = b
f < c¯j. All other non-constrained firms i ∈ N \ j bid bi ∈
[0, bj] if the price setter j is non-constrained (Kj ≥ K˘) or bi ∈ [0, bf ] if
it is constrained (Kj < K˘). Any firm j ∈ P , for which either bf > c¯j
holds, or for which bj < bf and Kj > K˘ holds, can no longer be price
setting and its monopoly price pj on its residual demand can no longer
be the equilibrium price.
(iii) If b1 < b
f < p1 holds and all potentially price setting firms j ∈ P are
non-constrained with Kj ≥ K˘, then there is no longer any equilibrium
in pure strategies.
25
Proof. See the arguments above. 
Compared to a general bid floor potentially even more low price equilibria
disappear than if no price floors were implemented.
4 Winners and Losers of the Bid Regulation
Here we discuss which firms lose and which firms gain from the introduction
of (potentially selective) bid caps or bid floors. Obviously firms can win or
gain if the regulations change the market outcome. This means that a bid
cap prevents a market equilibrium with a high price or the bid floor prevents
an equilibrium with a low price.
Whether firms lose or gain depends in case of a price cap also on whether
the firms play still the same role in the new equilibrium as before. If, for
example, after the introduction of a general bid cap the same firm j as
before bids the highest price, but now bˆ instead of pj, then all firms lose.
The marginal bidder is no longer able to set a price that maximizes its profit
on the residual demand for capacity, but is forced to bid lower and therefore
achieves a lower suboptimal profit, despite selling a larger capacity. The
inframarginal bidders still sell their total capacity, but also suffer from the
lower price.
Now suppose that, due to the introduction of a general bid cap, firm j
that used to bid pj > bˆ is no longer the highest bidder but substituted by
another marginal bidder, firm i which is bidding either bˆ or pi < bˆ. In these
new equilibria the former marginal firm j gains compared to the situation
without the cap, as long as the new marginal firm is not a low capacity firm
that only became marginal due to the bid cap and would have been overbid
by firm j without the bid cap.
Without a bid cap all potentially marginal firms (all firms j ∈ P as
defined in equation (7) from proposition 2) prefer the equilibria where another
firm i ∈ P bids highest and becomes marginal instead of them even if the
equilibrium price might be lower because inframarginal firms sell more. Thus,
if the introduction of the bid cap triggers a role shift such that it is now no
longer firm j but another firm i which bid highest then firm j can benefit.
For this to happen firm i may not be one of the firms that would never be
marginal without a cap because it would be overbid by firm j and all other
firms with a higher capacity than firm j. All inframarginal firms lose due
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to the lower price and, in case of the newly marginal firm i, also due to the
lower quantity.
Selective bid caps do not make a big difference. They matter in terms
of gains and losses, if the equilibrium price is reduced. The pattern is the
same as with general bid caps. All Firms lose if the marginal firm stays the
same as without the cap. If a role shift occurs the formerly marginal firm is
potentially the only one which gains. Losses might however be lower than
with the same general bid cap, if the equilibrium price reduction is lower
because the equilibrium price still exceeds the bid cap.
No matter whether the bid cap is general or selective, it either has no effect
on the equilibria or it reduces the industry’s revenues and the auctioneer’s
procurement costs.20 Thus, the incentive to invest in capacity or not to divest
capacity is either not affected or reduced. Price floors have the opposite
effect. Either they do not have an effect or they increase the industry’s
revenues and the auctioneer’s procurement costs because they prevent some
low price equilibria.
So if firm j was the marginal bidder in an equilibrium now prevented
by the price floor it will always benefit together with all inframarginal firms
which stay inframarginal because the price increases and the marginal firm
sells more. If this happens there is always a role shift, meaning firm j can no
longer be the highest bidder and the role of the marginal firm must now be
played by another firm i ∈ P . Firm i is then the only firm which loses due
to the price floor and the price increase because it sells less of its capacity.
5 Conclusions
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the reduction of selective bid caps in
the NYICAP in 2008 should have reduced the upper limit of the range of
observed equilibrium prices but not necessarily to the level of the selective
bid caps. The same should hold for the inframarginal bids. At the same point
in time the newly introduced selective price floors should have increased the
lower level of the observed equilibrium prices in the auction, even if the lower
limits of the observed equilibrium prices without the price floors were way
20Since the marginal firm maximizes always its profits on the residual demand instead
of on the total demand, the equilibrium price is always below the price that maximizes the
industry’s revenues from the mechanism. A further reduction in price due to the price cap
always means that total revenues from the mechanism in the industry decrease further.
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above the introduced price floors. Trivially there will be more inframarginal
bids above the selective price floor.
So, both changes together should have compressed the observed equilib-
rium prices from both sides and, chosen adequately, should have reduced the
deviations from the targeted reference price. Whether the expected revenues
from the capacity market were increased or reduced depends on the chosen
bid caps and bid floors, but taken together it is not clear from the outset
whether the incentive to invest in new electricity capacity increased or de-
creased. The only effect of the reform could have been that the regulators
more often than not hit the reference price.
Of course our model can also be applied to other multi-unit uniform price
auctions. However, in reality reservation prices are rarely used in treasury
auctions although there is evidence for underpricing (see Kremer and Nyborg
(2004) and Keloharyu et al. (2005)) and it seems clear not only from the
analysis here that the prices of treasury bonds could be increased by using
them.21 Betz et al. (2010) report that bid caps are relatively common in
emission permit auctions. Our analysis shows that regulation authorities
can use a reserve price to ensure a sufficiently high price.
A drawback of our analysis is, of course, that there is no asymmetric
information as, for example, in Ausubel et al. (2014). So, it would be inter-
esting to analyze bid caps and bid floors in a setting where, for example, only
the firm itself knows, how much capacity it can supply to the market. Then
the auction should also serve the purpose to inform the auctioneer about the
availability of capacity and too stringent attempts by the auctioneer to keep
the price within limits could easily be counter-productive in pursuing this
purpose.
21Some bidders in the US treasury auction are, however, restricted in the quantity that
they can buy.
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Appendix
A Explanation for Why Splitting a Firm’s
Total Capacity Does not Change the Out-
come of the Auction
To see this, remember that the demand is certain and common knowledge.
Then, if a firm’s bid for its total capacity is optimal, given the other firms’
bids, this firm never gains from withholding part of its capacity at this bid
and ask for a higher (or lower) price on the withheld capacity.
With a higher price bid on only a portion of the capacity, the firm either
sells the same at the same price, if it is still underbidding the marginal firm
or, if it is bidding above the marginal firm or it is increasing its own marginal
bid, it can potentially increase the auction price at the cost of selling less than
before. However, if increasing the price (and losing volume) increased the
firms surplus, it could have achieved the same higher surplus if it had bid the
higher price already on the total capacity before (if itself stays marginal) or
if it had increased the price to a level slightly below the now newly marginal
firm. In both cases this contradicts the assumption that the original bid on
the total capacity was, to begin with, a best response to all the other bids in
the market.
Similarly, lowering the price on a portion of the capacity can also not be
beneficial. If the original bid on the total capacity is not marginal, lowering
the price on a portion, either changes nothing, because the bid was already
before below the marginal bid or, if it was the marginal bid or above it, it
increases potentially the volume at a cost of a lower price. Again if the latter
is beneficial, the firm should have bid lower on its total capacity already at
the start and the original bid cannot have been a best response.22
22Of course these arguments would no longer hold if the demand were stochastic at the
time of the firm’s bid or if the different units of a firm’s capacity had different supply
costs.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
B.1 Characterization of the Nash Equilibria for Less
Capacity Constrained Firms
Assume Q 6= ∅ and consider first the case with Kj > α− K¯ for some j ∈ Q.
This implies that these firms can potentially bid their monopoly price on
the residual demand pj and be price setting with bj = pj = p because it is
feasible. Note that pj > pi if Kj > Ki. Firm j bidding bj = pj = p and all
other firms bidding lower can only be a Nash equilibrium if no low bidding
firm wants to overbid and firm j does not want to underbid the second
highest bid. Let us first consider overbidding by other firms. If Ki < Kj
then optimally overbidding bj = pj implies bi = pj + ε with ε → 0 and a
profit of pjD
r(pj, K−i) because pi < pj. One can show that for all i > j the
profit from overbidding is smaller than the profit from either underbidding
or matching bj = pj if Kj > α − K¯. Now suppose Ki > Kj > α − K¯ then
the optimal overbidding strategy for firm i would be to bid bi = pi. However,
firm i only wants to overbid firm j with bj = pj if the profit from doing
so is higher than matching or underbidding firm j. Note that matching is
always weakly dominated by undercutting. So firm i only has an incentive
to overbid if
piD
r(pi, K−i) > pjKi ⇔ Kj < (α− K¯)
2 +K2i
2Ki
.
This implies that bj = pj = p and all other firms bidding lower can only
be an equilibrium strategy if the condition above holds for none of the firms
with Ki > Kj. Since the right hand side of this inequality increases in Ki
for Ki > Kj > α− K¯, this is ensured if it holds for the firm with the highest
capacity K1, meaning (7) holds. Now let us check under which condition
underbidding the second lowest bid by firm j is more profitable for firm j.
Suppose bi < bj = pj is the second highest bid. Firm j is only tempted to
undercut if
biKj > pjD
r(pj, K−j)⇔ bi > (α− K¯ +Kj)
2
4βKj
.
Thus, if (8) holds firm j does not have an incentive to undercut and the
equilibria characterised in proposition 2 do exist for Kj > α− K¯.
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B.2 Characterization of the Nash Equilibria for More
Capacity Constrained Firms
Assume again that Q 6= ∅, but consider now the case with Kj ≤ α−K¯ for all
j ∈ Q. Then for all the potentially price setting firms j ∈ Q the monopoly
price on their specific residual demand is smaller than the price that balances
total capacity with total demand, meaning pj ≤ p¯. Suppose now that firm
i ∈ N bids the highest price bi ≥ bj for all j ∈ N with j 6= i for its capacity
Ki. As long as bi ≤ p¯ the equilibrium price would be p¯ because the auctioneer
needs to increase the price from bi to p¯ in order to balance supply and demand
and firm i would sell all its capacity Ki at the price p = p¯. None of the other
firms j 6= i would like to overbid firm i. For all p¯ ≥ bj > bi the auction price
would not change and any firm j would still sell its total capacity at p = p¯,
whereas firm j would lose profits as soon as it sets bj > p¯ ≥ bi because then
firm j would generate its monopoly profit on its residual demand which is
due to p¯ > pj monotonously decreasing for all p = bj > p¯ > pj. In addition
firm i with bi ≤ p¯ has neither an incentive to underbid any of its competitors
nor to increase its bid bi > p¯. In the first case nothing would change for firm
i. It would still sell its total capacity at a price of p = p¯. In the second case
firm i would also decrease its profits because of the same argument made
before for an overbidding firm j. Thus, there are infinitely many equilibria
in pure strategies where all the firms j ∈ N bid bj ≤ p¯.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Assume again that Q 6= ∅ holds and that Kj < α − K¯ holds for some
j ∈ Q. Assume in addition that the bid cap can potentially have an influence
on the market price because bˆ > α−K¯
β
= p¯. Those firms j for which the
monopoly price on their residual demand exceeds the bid cap pj > bˆ⇔ Kj >
2βbˆ− (α− K¯) can at most bid bˆ and they are willing to do so as long as
bˆDr(bˆ, K−j) ≥ biKj for all i ∈ N \ j.
This implies that all the other firms i ∈ N \ j bid such that bi ≤ bˆ where bˆ is
defined in equation (9) in proposition 4 and b in equation (8) in proposition
2.
Note that overbidding is not an option for all firms i ∈ N \j and matching
the bid bj = bˆ would clearly reduce their profits. Thus, for all firms j ∈ Q
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with Kj > 2bbˆ−(a−K¯) bidding bˆ and all other firms i ∈ N \j bidding bi ≤ bˆ
are Nash equilibria. Now assume that the firm j ∈ Q with Kj ≤ 2βbˆ−(α−K¯)
sets its monopoly price pj on the residual demand. As long as there are no
other firms i ∈ N \ j for which the bid cap could potentially bind, meaning
Ki ≤ 2βbˆ−(α−K¯) for all i ∈ N \j the bid cap has no impact and proposition
2 still applies. However if there are other firms i withKi > 2βbˆ−(α−K¯) ≥ Kj
then firm j bidding pj and all other firms i ∈ N \j bidding bi < pj can only be
part of a Nash equilibrium if none of the firms with Ki > 2βbˆ−(α−K¯) ≥ Kj
has an incentive to overbid with bi = bˆ meaning
bˆDr(bˆ, K−i) ≤ pjKi ⇔ Kj ≥ 2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+Ki − K¯)−Ki(α− K¯)
Ki
.
When taking into account that the condition above needs to hold for all firms
with Ki > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) ≥ Kj and that the right-hand side of the condition
increases in Ki it becomes obvious that it must be satisfied for the largest
potentially restrained bidder Ki = K1 > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) ≥ Kj for the Nash
equilibrium with bj = pj and bi ≤ b to exist for Ki > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) ≥ Kj
which implies (10), given in proposition 4.
D Proof of proposition 6
If Kˆ < 2βbˆ+ K¯ −α then the bid constraint bˆ does not constrain a firm with
capacity Ki = Kˆ because its monopoly price on the residual demand pi does
not exceed bˆ but potentially some of the firms j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ. On
the other hand if all the firms j ∈ Q have a capacity Kj > Kˆ all of them
are potentially constrained. In both cases the selective bid cap has the same
effect as if it would not have been tied to the condition that Kj ≥ Kˆ and
proposition 4 would still apply.
If there are, however, firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ− (α− K¯) and at
least K1 > Kˆ then these firms j are not constrained by the bid cap, although
they would be if bˆ would not have been applied only selectively. These firms
can still bid bj = pj whereas at least firm 1 is constrained and can only bid
b1 ≤ bˆ < p1.
Of course all the firms j ∈ Q with Kj > Kˆ can still be price setting in
equilibrium if
bˆDr(bˆ, K¯−j) ≥ biKj for all i ∈ N \ j ⇔ bi ≤ bˆj
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with bˆj defined in (9) and none of the firms i ∈ Q with Ki ∈ (2βbˆ+K¯−α, Kˆ)
wants to overbid firm j by bidding bi = pi > bˆ.
23 The latter holds true if
bˆKi ≥ piDr(pi, K−i) ⇔ Ki ≤ 2βbˆ+ K¯ − α + 2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α) (12)
for all i with Ki ∈ (2βbˆ+ K¯ − α, Kˆ).
Thus if (12) holds, the equilibria where any of the firms j with Kj > Kˆ is
bidding bˆ and all the other firms i ∈ N \ j bid bi ≤ bˆj still exists. Note that
with Kˆ ≤ 2βbˆ + K¯ − α + 2
√
βbˆ(βbˆ+ K¯ − α) condition (12) is necessarily
satisfied.
In addition the unconstrained firms j with Kj ∈ (2βbˆ − (α − K¯), Kˆ)
could bid bj = pj > bˆ and be price setting. This could only be an equilibrium
if firm j could not generate more profits by undercutting another firm i’s
bid bi, meaning all other firms need to bid bi ≤ bj which is defined in (8).
At the same point in time no other firm i with Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ), should be
tempted to overbid firm j with bi = pi.
24 Thus, bj = pj for firm j ∈ Q with
Kˆ > Kj > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) and bi ≤ bj for all i ∈ N \ j can only be an
equilibrium if
pjKi ≥ piDr(pi, K−i)⇔ Kj ≥ K
2
i + (α− K¯)2
2Ki
for all Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ). (13)
Note that the latter inequality is increasing on the right-hand side in Ki and
is necessarily satisfied if Kj >
Kˆ2+(α−K¯)2
2Kˆ
.
Also firms j ∈ Q with Kˆ > 2βbˆ − (α − K¯) ≥ Kj can potentially be
price setting and bid bj = pj ≤ bˆ in equilibrium. In this case the other firms
i ∈ N \ j need to bid again bi ≤ bj < pj. However, now all firms i ∈ Q
with K1 ≥ Ki > Kj could potentially overbid firm j with either bi = bˆ if
Ki ∈ [Kˆ,K1] or with bi = pi if Ki ∈ (Kj, Kˆ). In an equilibrium they should
not have an incentive to do so. The latter implies not only that(13) needs to
hold but also
pjKi ≥ bˆDr(bˆ, K−i)
23Note that the firms i ∈ Q with Ki 6∈ (2βbˆ+ K¯ − α, Kˆ) do not want to overbid bj = bˆ
because pi < bˆ.
24Note that the firms i with Ki ∈ [Kˆ,K1] cannot overbid firm j’s bid bj = pj and, as
before no firm with Ki < Kj will ever be tempted to overbid.
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⇔ Kj ≥ 2βbˆ(α− βbˆ+Ki − K¯)−Ki(α− K¯)
Ki
for all Ki ∈ [Kˆ,K1].
This restriction is again increasing in Ki and is therefore equivalent with
Kj ∈ Pˆ as defined in (10).
E Existence of the Alternative Equilibria with
General Price Floors
Note that if all firms bid at the bid floor each firm achieves a profit of
bf
Kj(α− βbf )
K¯
.
If firm j ∈ P bids its monopoly price on its residual demand, instead, and
all other firms i stick to the price floor, bi = b
f firm j’s profit is
(α− K¯ +Kj)2
4β
.
The former exceeds the latter as long as bf ≤ c¯j holds, meaning that the
price setting firm j does not want to match the other firms’ bid at the bid
floor. The firms that bid at the bid floor do not want to overbid firm j as
long as j ∈ P . Note that c¯j > bj and that it is also increasing in Kj for the
potentially relevant range of max{α− K¯, K¯ −α} < Kj < K¯. As soon as the
bid floor exceeds the threshold c1, implying p1 > b
f > c¯1, even firm 1 with the
largest profit from bidding its monopoly price on its residual demand prefers
to bid at the price floor instead. Since no longer any firm wants to overbid if
all firms j set bj = b
f and no firm can underbid, this is an equilibrium in pure
strategies. Other bidding equilibria in pure strategies with bj = b > b
f for
all j ∈ N cannot exist because then each firm has an incentive to underbid
in order to sell its total capacity instead of a rationed share.
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